THE INDEPENDENT

Errors, not vandals, blamed for disaster in damning report

By Barrie Clement, Transport Editor

30 May 2003

Management failures at the rail company Jarvis were probably responsible for the "poor condition" of points that caused the Potters Bar train crash, a damning official report published yesterday said.

The deficiencies of the equipment were caused by "inappropriate adjustment and insufficient maintenance", Health and Safety Executive (HSE) rail inspectors found.

The most thorough report yet into the accident registered scepticism on claims by Jarvis that sabotage was the probable cause of the crash in which seven people died and more than 70 were injured.

Although Jarvis was not explicitly blamed, a catalogue of incompetence raises the prospect of manslaughter charges against senior management. An inquiry by British Transport Police is due to be passed to the Crown Prosecution Service in August.

Yesterday's report into last May's crash found that points 2182A had been "poorly maintained". Evidence was found on other points in the area that there had been difficulties in keeping nuts firmly attached.

Inspectors found there had been "poor adjustment of the equipment" and that wear on the threads of "stretcher bars" - which keep the rails apart - meant that nuts would be "susceptible to loosening over a period of time". Other parts of the equipment showed evidence of fatigue.

There seemed to be no guidance or instruction for setting up, inspecting and maintaining points such as 2182A based on an understanding of the design of the safety-critical equipment.

Even several weeks later investigators found there was a failure to apply good practice to similar points on other parts of the network. Investigators concluded there might have been a wider problem.

The report confirms that on 10 May the fourth coach of a four-carriage express from King's Cross to Kings Lynn derailed as it ran over the points. The final coach "became airborne", ending up straddling platforms, having struck a waiting room.

The board investigating the disaster was satisfied that no evidence had been established to support speculation about sabotage and that an explanation of the crash could be based on evidence of the poor condition of the points. Investigators found that an effective management system for critical equipment such as points was not evident at the private-sector company Railtrack, which was ultimately responsible at the time. The report said that there had been welcome signs of change through the creation of the state-backed Network Rail.

Jarvis said last night that it had maintained the points in accordance with long-established industry procedures and it was "still uncertain" what caused the points failure.

Bob Crow, general secretary of the biggest rail union, the RMT, said "privateers" had tried to blame everyone but themselves but now had "real questions to answer".

He said maintenance companies that cut corners and compromised safety were "clearly guilty of criminal negligence" and legislation to introduce a charge of corporate killing should be brought in.

Alistair Darling, the Transport Secretary, said Network Rail was getting a grip on what needed to be done on maintenance in a way that "simply didn't happen under Railtrack".

Dr Mike Weightman, who chaired the investigating board, said: "We are not saying the rail network is unsafe or that the regulatory regime is ineffectual. There are important lessons and... the opportunity exists to develop a safer, more reliable cost-effective railway system."

Alan Osborne, director of rail safety at the HSE, said: "We accept without reservation all of the recommendations and have begun implementation.'' A final report will be concluded by the HSE after the end of any legal proceedings.

The main points of the report

* No evidence was found to support Jarvis's claim that sabotage or "deliberate unauthorised interference" with the points led to the crash.

* Similar although less serious problems might have affected equipment elsewhere on the network.

* Earlier inspections had not spotted defects in the points at Potters Bar.

* Investigators found "inappropriate adjustment and insufficient maintenance" of
the points.

* The points were "poorly maintained" and there was a failure to understand their design and safety requirements.

* There were two systems for inspecting and maintaining the points. Roles and responsibilities might not have been clear.

* The response to a report of a "rough ride" near the points on the night before the derailment was insufficient.

* The HSE had no evidence that Network Rail had reviewed its management systems since the crash.

 © 2003 Independent Digital (UK) Ltd